The merchant will have to sue in a separate action in state court. See 6 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. The problem with the latter view is it ignores Rule 13 a.
These two parties have engaged in only one set of interrelated dealings. That is one transaction or occurrence. The fact that the rule allows the merchant to bring an ordinary state law collection counterclaim in federal court, or that the result might undermine to some extent the federal policy of deterring abusive debt collection, should be irrelevant. The remedy of the rules is an order for separate trials under Rule 42 a , not a refusal to allow the pleading.
A counterclaim is asserted against an opposing party. A crossclaim is asserted against a coparty. Since the crossclaim arises from the same contract as the original claim, it clearly satisfies the requirement that it arise from the same transaction or occurrence. Since both D2 and D1 are citizens of Texas, the crossclaim does not independently satisfy the diversity requirement. Supplemental jurisdiction will be necessary. The short answer is that a crossclaim always qualifies for supplemental jurisdiction.
Once a defendant asserts a cross-claim against another defendant, the two become opposing parties, and the proper device for the second defendant to assert a claim back against the crossclaiming defendant is a counterclaim. Since all of these claims arise from the same contract, this would be a compulsory counterclaim. Since both D1 and D2 are citizens of Texas, the counterclaim does not meet the diversity requirement itself. The short answer is that a compulsory counterclaim always qualifies for supplemental jurisdiction.
P former employee, a citizen of Illinois, sues both D1 former employer, a corporation incorporated and operating solely within Illinois, and D2 former supervisor, a citizen of Illinois, for a violation of Title VII in firing her. Can D2 crossclaim against D1 for indemnity to be paid in the event P succeeds in the lawsuit? This crossclaim against a coparty arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim.
The crossclaim does not satisfy federal jurisdiction itself because it presents a state law question and the parties are not diverse. Because the crossclaim is for possible indemnity in the event P wins her claim, the crossclaim arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim and so is part of the same case or controversy under Article III.
P, a citizen of Arizona, sues D1, a citizen of California, and D2, a citizen of California, for negligence in an auto accident occurring in California. The crossclaim does not satisfy federal jurisdiction itself because it presents a state law question and the jurisdictional amount is not sufficient.
Because the crossclaim is for possible contribution in the event P wins the claim, the crossclaim arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim and so is part of the same case or controversy under Article III. P sues D1 and D2 for conspiracy to violate the federal antitrust laws. Can D1 file a crossclaim against D2 for breach of an unrelated contract?
A factually unrelated claim by definition does not. P, a citizen of Kentucky, sues D1, a citizen of Ohio, and D2, a citizen of Ohio, for breach of contract. D1 files a cross-claim against D2 for breach of the same contract. Can D1 at the same time join an unrelated tort claim against D2? Once D1 asserts a proper crossclaim against D2, he can join any other claims he has against that party. Diversity is absent between D1 and D2, so supplemental jurisdiction is required to bring the crossclaim and the additionally joined claim into federal court.
The crossclaim is based on the same contract and so qualifies for supplemental jurisdiction. The unrelated claim, even though Rule 18 allows it to be joined, must find its own way into federal court. No supplemental jurisdiction. P commences an action against D for negligence arising from an auto accident.
P serves the complaint on D on June D answers with a denial on July 1. D serves a third-party complaint on third-party defendant [3D] on July Will the court strike the third-party complaint on motion of either P or 3D? Rule 14 allows defendant 14 days after service of the answer to serve a third-party complaint without leave of court.
Since more than 14 days have passed, defendant will have to obtain leave of court. This early in the litigation, the court is highly likely to grant leave to assert the impleader, so an answer of no on reasoning that the impleader is not timely but that the court will likely grant leave instead of granting the motion to strike is acceptable.
P commences an action against D for negligence arising from a three-car auto accident. D serves a third-party complaint on 3D, the driver of the third car. The third-party complaint asserts D was not negligent and 3D was negligent. This is not a claim of derivative liability; it is a defense that another, alternative defendant is liable directly to the plaintiff. It is not a proper use of third-party practice.
Can D implead 3D, a citizen of Washington, for indemnity on liability on the contract? This is a proper use of third-party practice, since the liability would be derivative. With regard to federal jurisdiction, the original claim satisfied diversity jurisdiction Washington v. This claim by the third-party defendant directly against the plaintiff is allowed by Fed. With regard to federal jurisdiction, the claim does not independently satisfy diversity Washington v.
Washington , so we must consider supplemental jurisdiction. Consequently, supplemental jurisdiction exists. This claim by the plaintiff directly against the third-party defendant is allowed by Fed. With regard to federal jurisdiction, however, the claim does not independently satisfy diversity Washington v. Consequently, supplemental jurisdiction does not exist. P, a citizen of Michigan, sues D, a citizen of Ohio, for an auto accident.
D asserts a permissive counterclaim against P for breach of an unrelated contract. Assume the jurisdictional amounts in both claims are adequate. Can P implead X, a citizen of Ohio, for indemnity on any liability on the contract? Can D then assert a claim directly against X for breach of the same contract, and will the federal court have supplemental jurisdiction over that claim?
The permissive counterclaim satisfies federal jurisdiction independently Ohio v. Michigan for sufficient amount. The third-party claim independently satisfies federal jurisdictional requirements Michigan v. Ohio for complete indemnity , so supplemental jurisdiction is not needed.
Yes and yes. The claim by the original defendant D directly against X is allowed by Fed. With regard to federal jurisdiction, the claim does not independently satisfy diversity Michigan v.
Michigan , so we must consider supplemental jurisdiction. Under b , this is not a claim by a plaintiff against a person made party under Rule Glitch in the statute or intended, this third-party claim is in federal court.
Can P permissively join both D1 and D2 as defendants in a single lawsuit? The first requirement for permissive joinder of defendants, that the claims against both arise from the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, is satisfied. Even though the claim against D1 and the claim against D2 are separated in time by several months, will involve little overlap in evidence, and are on different theories of recovery, the important fact is that there was only one fire.
Everything arose from that single event. The second requirement, that at least one common question will arise [Fed. P1 is a pedestrian on the sidewalk. A car driven by D runs a stop sign and broadsides a car driven by P2. Can P1 and P2 permissively join together to sue D in a single lawsuit? Assume P1 and P2 have not yet sued D. More than a year later, P1 still has not recovered from the accident injuries. She consults D2, a physician, and is treated negligently. Can P1 and P2 permissively join together as plaintiffs to sue in a single lawsuit and permissively join both D and D2 as defendants?
The first requirement for permissive joinder of plaintiffs, that the claims of both arise from the same transaction or occurrence, is satisfied. There was only one accident. The second requirement of a single common question is easily met.
Both P1 and P2 can permissively join as plaintiffs for the reasons given in the answer to Part 1. Plaintiffs can permissively join both D and D2 as defendants for the same reasons given in the answer to Q Even though the medical malpractice occurred more than a year after the accident, it clearly arose from the events of the accident and therefore is part of the same series of transactions or occurrences.
P, a citizen of Louisiana, undergoes an operation in which a plate and screw device is implanted into his back. The device breaks. P sues D device manufacturer, a citizen of Pennsylvania, in federal court. P sues D surgeon, a citizen of Louisiana, in a separate suit in state court. D manufacturer moves to dismiss the federal suit for failure to join a Rule 19 party.
Should the motion to dismiss be granted? The common law has always given plaintiff the option to sue one or more at his option, and the unlucky chosen defendant cannot force joinder of, or demand dismissal for failure to join, the other s.
Temple v. Synthes Corp. P, a citizen of Virginia, enters a contract with D1, a citizen of North Carolina, and at the same time enters a related contract with D2, a citizen of Virginia. Both contracts refer to each other, and interpretation of one will require interpretation of the other.
Both defendants fail to perform. P sues D1 for breach of contract. D1 moves to dismiss for failure to join a Rule 19 party D2 cannot be joined since diversity would be destroyed. Should the motion be granted? We hope you recognized this is a trick question. The proper answer is that no answer can be given until we grind our way through the considerations of Federal Rule 19 a and 19 b.
A categorical answer to this question, based only on the information so far at hand, would be to place a conclusory label on D2, which is exactly what Fed. P, a citizen of Florida, is employed by D Corporation, incorporated in Delaware with principal place of business in Georgia. Plaintiff was fired once.
The claims against both defendants arise from the same transaction or occurrence. Common questions not only exist, but also they likely predominate. Here, a federal question—alleged violation of Title VII, a federal statute—is presented. P1, P2, and P3, all citizens of Pennsylvania, together open a small business and rent a property from D in New Jersey. The business does not succeed, and Ps believe the failure is because D fraudulently represented the nature of the property.
Can the three plaintiffs join together to sue D? Will the court have supplemental jurisdiction over cross-claims by P1 against the other two plaintiffs for contribution? This is permissive joinder of plaintiffs. All three plaintiffs were involved in the same business deal for the same property. This is the same transaction or occurrence.
Common questions involving all four include whether a fraudulent representation was made, whether defendant acted with scienter, and the like. The answer to this question is the same as was discussed above in II. Diversity exists between P1 and D. The amounts claimed by P2 and P3 are insufficient. Some federal courts read the statute as it is written and allow supplemental jurisdiction even though the rather clear intent was not to allow supplemental jurisdiction in such a situation.
The federal court certainly has supplemental jurisdiction over the compulsory counterclaim. Another glitch.
When a man is killed in an auto accident, his two children as next of kin bring a wrongful death action against the other driver for negligence. Upon learning of the action, a woman who claims she is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased seeks to intervene as a plaintiff to share in any recovery. Should this nonparty be allowed to intervene of right?
The intervenor has an interest in the damages for wrongful death that may be recovered. So long as the petition for intervention is timely, it should be granted. A corporation wishes to open a drug treatment facility in a vacant building that formerly was a neighborhood school. To do so, it must obtain a conditional use permit from the city. Under pressure from a neighborhood association comprised of neighboring property owners, the city council turns down the permit.
The corporation sues the city to require it to issue the permit. Will the neighborhood association be allowed to intervene of right as a defendant? Assume the association does not seek to intervene. When the trial court orders the city to issue the conditional use permit and the city council decides not to appeal, will the association be allowed to intervene of right to pursue the appeal?
The interests of the neighborhood association are adequately represented by the city, which is defending the action. Even though the members of the association have property interests that may be impaired, they cannot intervene of right. Since the association is no longer adequately represented, it has a right to intervene, so long as it petitions for intervention in a timely fashion. Plaintiff will argue intervention following final judgment in the trial court is not timely.
The association will argue it acted promptly as soon as it had a right to intervene. While the majority opinion would be that the association may intervene of right [ see II. Omegon, Inc. City of Minnetonka , N. P, a citizen of Tennessee, sues D, a corporation incorporated in Nevada with principal place of business in Kentucky, for pollution of a body of water on which P is a landowner.
The basis of federal jurisdiction is diversity. I, a citizen of Kentucky, who owns land that borders on the same body of water, petitions to intervene of right, or in the alternative permissively, as a plaintiff. Assuming Fed. The insured dies. The daughter of the insured, a citizen of California, sues in state court to recover the proceeds.
The widow of the insured, a citizen of California, informs the insurance company she also intends to claim the proceeds. Will the insurance company be able to interplead the daughter and widow in federal court? Neither type of interpleader—statutory or under the rule—is available on these facts.
Statutory interpleader requires minimal diversity of claimants [ see 28 U. The citizenship of the insurance company is irrelevant since it is not claiming the stake. Interpleader under the rule [Fed.
Diversity is satisfied since the insurance company is a citizen of Ohio and both claimants are citizens of California, but the jurisdictional amount is insufficient. The insurance company will have to interplead the claimants in state court. P, a citizen of Illinois, advertises a baseball autographed by Babe Ruth on an internet auction website.
P then receives a letter from the New York Yankees baseball club informing him that the ball was stolen from a memorabilia display owned by the club. Will P be able to bring an action against the three claimants for federal statutory interpleader? Will P be able to bring an action against the three claimants for interpleader under the rule? Standard jurisdiction requirements apply to interpleader under the rule [Fed. Diversity jurisdiction does not exist. The depositor dies.
Will the bank be able to bring an action against the four claimants for federal statutory interpleader? Will the bank be able to bring an action against the four claimants for interpleader under the rule? All claimants here are citizens of Texas. Statutory interpleader is not available. Complete diversity exists between the plaintiff bank and all defendant claimants. The venue statute [28 U. Should the bank commence the action in federal court in New Mexico, personal jurisdiction over the Texas defendants may be a problem.
We have not written a computer-assisted exercise to accompany this written exercise on joinder and supplemental jurisdiction, but the CALI library includes three self-contained exercises from which to choose. This exercise is intended to allow students to review joinder of claims and parties under the Federal Rules.
The exercise uses a construction project litigation as the basis for the questions. The litigation grows gradually, adding claims and parties along the way. This exercise is designed to be used in different ways.
Students may use it as a tutorial to accompany assigned readings, as a supplement to reinforce concepts discussed in class, or as a review before exams. The program is interactive, requiring the student to respond to various questions and hypotheticals to learn the principles embodied in the rules.
It does not assume any specific knowledge of the joinder rules—it is designed to teach the rules from scratch. The program uses hypertext links between various parts of the program. These links offer students options in navigating through the program so they are not forced to follow a particular order. The user is the master of the organization. All of the rules and statutes that are needed are available as part of the program and may be viewed at any time by selecting an on-screen button.
The program includes units on a variety of joinder topics: claim joinder Rule 18 ; permissive party joinder Rule 20 ; counterclaims Rule 13 ; crossclaims Rule 13 ; third-party claims Rule 14 ; compulsory joinder of parties Rule 19 ; and intervention Rule It also contains an extensive unit devoted to the subject matter jurisdiction problems raised by these rules.
Finally, there is a review unit to allow the user to apply the principles learned in the lesson. This exercise briefly describes the concept of interpleader and some of the historical limitations on the remedy, but its focus is on statutory interpleader [28 U. The lesson introduces the various procedural issues involved—such as subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue—and highlights the differences between statutory and rule interpleader on these subjects.
The lesson also contains a segment on the problem presented in enjoining other pending actions. The lesson requires the student to use the relevant statutes and rules, which are included in the lesson. Clark, Code Pleading 2d ed. Return to text. See 6A Charles A. This exercise does not consider standing to sue ability of a person to challenge governmental action.
See 13A Charles A. This exercise also does not consider class actions, a joinder device that allows a large number of persons to join as plaintiffs or defendants in a single litigation. The multiple nuances of that topic far exceed the scope of this brief treatment of joinder devices. See generally 7A-7B Charles A. State courts of general jurisdiction do not have problems with limited subject matter jurisdictional reach, so joinder problems in state courts are limited to the joinder devices.
Gibbs , U. The idea that federal courts have power to hear all aspects of a case traces back to Osborn v. Bank of the United States , 22 U. Howard , U. Paragraph c outlines situations in which the federal court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Paragraph d is a saving statute for statute of limitations purposes should the court send a state claim back to state court. Paragraph e defines state for purposes of the statute. A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that—at the time of its service—the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim:.
As can be seen, the pleader need not state a counterclaim it does not have at the time of serving the pleading. A they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and. A any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and.
Paul Gray, Inc. But in , Congress passed the Judicial Improvements Act, codifying the requirements for supplemental jurisdiction at 28 U. Therefore, when some, but not all, plaintiffs in a diversity action allege a sufficient amount in controversy, federal jurisdiction is proper.
Exxon Mobil did not involve a removal but relied on its earlier decision in Chicago v. College of Surgeons , U. Cases since have agreed that the Exxon Mobil rationale applies to cases removed from state court. Thermoguard Equip. Family Mut. Before you counsel your client that he can remove his case to federal court, you need to examine the language of 28 U. Under 28 U. The first prong of 28 U. Hyatt Corp. We can now add several tools to our arsenal of ways to remove cases to federal court even when the initial pleading might not look removable.
When faced with a complaint silent as to the amount in controversy, we can still timely remove the case after some initial discovery to pin down as the amount a plaintiff is seeking. Search Website Search Close Search. Practical Answers to Two Removal Questions. April 1, James M. Posted in News.
If a plaintiff has multiple claims against a single defendant then the court may aggregate claims to satisfy the amount in controversy. In the United States a tort is where a person harms someone else - - by doing something other than breaching a contract - - and the law allows the injured person to sue to recover for his damages.
Sometimes a wrongful act can be both a crime and a tort. For example, if a person physically harms someone else he could be liable for committing a crime and might also be sued. These claims satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. But courts may not aggregate claims against multiple defendants or claims by multiple plaintiffs. These claims do not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.
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